How Secure Are Your HCL Domino RSA Keys?
Daniel Nashed – 17 November 2026 23:51:25
Why old Notes IDs, server IDs, and certifier IDs deserve a closer look
The recent eMudhra certificate authority incident in October 2026 demonstrated something important:
Even certificates using modern cryptographic algorithms can be insecure when their underlying private keys do not provide sufficient security.
ECDSA P-384 intermediate CA keys were found to have only about 8 bits of entropy.
A mistake when generating the keys reduced the private key values to a single byte, making it possible to recover the private keys from publicly available certificate information.
The affected intermediate CA certificates had to be revoked.
This incident is a useful reminder for HCL Domino administrators, although the technical challenge is different.
How secure are the RSA keys that have been in your Domino environment for the last 10, 20, or even 30 years?
Old Notes IDs may still use quite short RSA keys
Domino environments are often upgraded continuously over decades. Servers are replaced, new Domino versions are installed, and new users are registered.
But existing Notes IDs may remain unchanged.
New users might already have 2048-bit RSA keys, while users registered many years ago could still have 1024-bit keys or even shorter ones.
The same applies to server IDs and, especially, organizational certifier IDs.
A certifier created decades ago may still use its original RSA key pair, even if its certificates have been renewed.
Recertification does not increase RSA key strength
Only a key rollover generates a new public/private key pair and allows to increase the RSA key length.
What does this have in common with the ECDSA incident
The eMudhra incident involved ECDSA keys with extremely low entropy. Their private values were so predictable that they could be recovered with minimal effort.
Short RSA keys have a different weakness: their modulus is too small to provide sufficient resistance against modern factoring attacks.
In both cases, the cryptographic algorithm may be implemented correctly, and the certificate may be technically valid.
But the underlying key does not provide the expected security.
A certificate's validity period tells us nothing about whether its key is still sufficiently strong.
This is particularly critical for certifier keys, because they establish trust for entire organizations.
What key lengths should we use today?
For Domino environments, reasonable RSA key-length targets are:
Notes Client and Server.ID
2048 bits RSA
Organizational and OU certifier IDs
4096 bits RSA
Longer keys offer additional security margin, especially for long-lived certification authorities.
However, key length alone is not sufficient. Secure key generation, protection of private keys, and proper certificate lifecycle management are equally important.
Key rollover is not a routine recertification
Upgrading existing Domino identities requires careful planning and testing.
User key rollover
must preserve historical private keys where they are needed to decrypt previously encrypted mail and documents. ID Vault integration and key synchronization also need to be considered.
Server key rollover
can affect authentication, certification chains, cross-certificates, and communication with other servers and clients.
Certifier key rollover
requires particular care because it affects the foundation of the Domino certification hierarchy.
Existing certificates, cross-organization trust relationships, ID Vault trust certificates, and recovery procedures may all need attention.
These changes should be tested in a representative environment before rolling them out to production.
Simply generating longer keys is not enough. The complete trust infrastructure must continue to work afterward.
Time for a Domino cryptographic inventory
The eMudhra incident demonstrates how a cryptographic weakness can remain unnoticed even in a modern certificate infrastructure.
For Domino, the lesson is to look beyond the current server version and certificate expiration dates.
Check the actual RSA key lengths of your users, servers, and certifiers.
Pay particular attention to IDs that have existed for many years and may never have undergone a key rollover.
A valid certificate does not necessarily mean a sufficiently secure key
And modernizing long-lived Domino identities is an important security task — one that deserves proper planning, testing, and a reliable recovery strategy.
Conclusion and Call to Action
Upgrading RSA keys is not just about selecting a larger key size. It is about preserving the trust and security of an entire Domino environment while replacing cryptographic foundations that may have been established decades ago.
My own Domino environments had a mix of RSA key lengths. Some identities had already been rolled over to 2048-bit RSA, and server IDs in particular had been on my list for some time.
But other IDs, including my original Notes ID from 1998, were still using much shorter keys.
The security of an certification hierarchy depends on the strength and protection of its certifier keys.
My recommendation is to review the RSA key lengths of all existing user, server, and certifier IDs — especially those that have survived many years of Domino upgrades.
Plan and test key rollovers carefully. Consider existing certificates, cross-certification, ID Vault trust relationships, and access to historically encrypted data.
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